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In this paper we tackle two shortcomings of present efficiency wage models. Firstly, 
they do not fully account for labour heterogeneity, thus implying that high-effort 
and low-effort units of labour are interchangeable. Secondly, building on this 
assumed homogeneity of labour, the models derive involuntary unemployment 
from effort decisions of workers, which are patently voluntary.  
We offer a consistent reformulation of the theory: Each of the effort or quality 
levels is regarded as a separate market which has its own clearing quantity and 
price. As such unemployment is a result of workers' reluctance to adjust to the 
prevailing market conditions on the respective labour sub-market.  
To further clarify heterogeneity in labour markets, we propose to employ the 
demand for workers' characteristics instead of the demand for workers. This 
microeconomic approach shows that in standard equilibrium employers will not 
choose among all workers but only select specific characteristic-types. Therefore to 
become attractive, an unemployed worker has to significantly alter either his wage 
or the bundle of offered characteristics.  
Both these modifications reinforce our central claim that free market interaction 
cannot lead to unemployment other than voluntary. 
  
Keywords: labour market; efficiency wages; involuntary unemployment; demand 
for heterogeneous goods. 
 
JEL: J64, J20. 1 Introduction
To understand why there is unemployment and whether it may be involuntary is an important
and long-lasting goal of the economic profession. Since the 1980s, the eciency-wage theories
have occupied a prominent place in labour market research. Their appeal rests in two features.
First, eciency-wage considerations derive the occurrence of involuntary unemployment only
from simple prot maximization of the rm. Second, they explain why wages are observed to
vary relatively little and employment to vary a lot.
In the present paper, we take issue with the main conclusions of eciency-wage models. In
our view, these models incorrectly specify the labour market as a homogeneous one, while they
implicitly model a situation of heterogeneous labour. This is why they necessarily lead to a
non-Walrasian outcome and imply involuntary unemployment. We show that if labour markets
are modelled as fully heterogeneous | an approach that we support | then the existence
of involuntary unemployment does not follow. Specically, we analyze the two most common
eciency-wage models: the Solow (1979) model, in some literature called the `generic' eciency
wage model, and the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) `shirking' model. Although the two models dier
in the degree of wage rigidity they lead to, they both imply involuntary unemployment and are
both based on the same microeconomic approach to labour markets. We oer an alternative
approach, and for this purpose we invoke the rather little known contribution of Lancaster
(1966, 1971) to show that the conclusion about involuntary unemployment does not hold.
It is important to stress that while our paper does not dispute the existence of unemploy-
ment in general, we object to the claim that involuntary unemployment is caused by market
optimization of rms. Therefore the main purpose of our paper is to contribute to logically
consistent theory and model building.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the two major eciency
models (Solow and Shapiro-Stiglitz) and for each provide critical analysis of its conclusions. In
this part, we focus on the particular layout of the model at hand. In Section 3, we generalize
our ndings and show their deeper implications (subsection 3.1) and then provide a formal
microeconomic setting (Lancaster's approach) which is adequate to address the problems and
which reinforces our case (subsection 3.2). Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Two Eciency-Wage Models
2.1 Solow's Model
2.1.1 The Standard Layout
Solow (1979) was one of the rst to formulate an eciency-wage model that would imply wage
rigidity and therefore involuntary unemployment. Here we use the most common version of the
model as presented in Romer (2006) to maintain the familiar notation.
There is a large number of identical competitive rms that maximize prots. To simplify
the analysis, only one input | labour | is assumed. The contribution of labour to output of
the rm depends positively on eort e that workers exert. This eort is assumed to enter the
1production function multiplicatively with labour. The production function is therefore
Y = F(eL) (1)
where F0() > 0, F00() < 0. The key element of the model is the assumption that higher wages
induce higher eort on worker's part, i.e. that e = e(w), where e0() > 0. Since rms are free
to choose both the wage and amount of employment, their optimisation problem is
max
L;w
fF(e(w)L)   wLg:1 (2)
The rst-order conditions are
F0(e(w)L)e(w)   w = 0
and
F0(e(w)L)Le0(w)   L = 0:
Assuming that second-order conditions are satised, the two equations yield the solution to




The interpretation is straightforward. The rm wants to nd such w* so as to minimize
the cost per unit of eective labour w=e(w) or, equivalently, maximize eort per dollar e(w)=w.
This happens at w* where average eort equals marginal eort which is the condition in (3).2
This equation therefore gives the optimal wage w*, which can then be plugged into either of
the two rst-order conditions to nd optimal employment L*.
The essential message of equation (3) is that optimal wage w* is completely independent of
the labour market. What drives wages is not standard supply of labour and demand for labour,
but only the eort function e(w) that workers have and that rms know about. Therefore, the
implication of the Solow model is that if the entry of eort into the production function is labour-
augmenting (i.e. e multiplies L rather than other potential inputs), then the optimal wage can
be completely rigid. This has important consequences. First, because all rms are identical,
each chooses w*, which implies a potential disequilibrium on the labour market. Whenever
w* exceeds the Walrasian equilibrium wage weq, involuntary unemployment results. This is
depicted in Figure 1. Second, because the wage is given by (3) and thus is unresponsive to
labour demand, swings in the labour demand curve only aect the amount of labour hired, not
the wage level. Therefore, the model seems to explain the empirically observed large movements
in employment as compared to the relatively small movements in wages.
1We assume that output price is normalized to one, i.e. output is the num eraire.









Dierentiating with respect to w and assuming that regularity conditions are satised, this yields the same
solution as in (3).













2.1.2 A Closer Look at Assumptions
The above Solow model is striking in that it does not produce disequilibria due to obstacles for
market functioning, due to market imperfections or non-maximizing behaviour, but precisely
because of prot-maximizing behaviour. The very goal to maximize prots leads rms to
disregard the market when setting wages. Solow's model has received repeated references
(Yellen, 1984) and extensions (Summers, 1988), and also relatively few criticisms (e.g. Bellante,
1994). However, to the best of our knowledge, the most problematic (and hidden) assumptions
in the model have not been discussed.
First, Solow (1979) assumes that the eort function is a xed, given relationship that cannot
be changed by the worker. However, this is not consistent with any conceivable idea of the
eort function, nor with denitions of eort by other authors. Second, Solow introduces only
one labour market, although he assumes from the very beginning that there are dierent types
(eorts or qualities) of labour. We discuss these two points in the next two parts, respectively.
2.1.3 The Nature of the Eort Function
The eort function represents the assumption that eort of workers varies with wage, but non-
linearly. It is necessary to clarify at the outset that both wages and labour output are ow
variables measured per unit of time. Therefore hourly eort e() (leading to certain hourly
output) is a non-linear function of hourly wage w.
It seems reasonable to assume that marginal eort e0() will be decreasing from some point.
No matter how high the oered hourly wage, there is an upper limit on how much a human can
perform. The assertion of increasing marginal eort at lower wages is more disputed, but can
also be justied on grounds of (mal)nutrition in developing countries or motivation in developed
countries.
As was shown above, the rm then sets the optimal wage w* to satisfy the unit wage
elasticity of eort in (3). Following this condition, eciency wage models proceed to assert
3that this generates downward wage rigidity. Workers cannot oer lower wages in order to nd
a job: In the region where marginal eort is increasing, lower wage w < w* would violate the
optimum condition of cost minimization for the rm and thus decrease its protability.
This however contradicts the nature of the eort function. Ever since Shapiro and Stiglitz
introduced in their seminal paper \the eort decision of a worker" (1984, p. 435), eort e()
is considered to be endogenous to the worker.3 If the worker is not successful at nding a job
paying certain desired wage per unit of eort, he receives a clear market signal that his services
are too expensive. The worker then has to oer a lower price | that is, he has to turn his eort
function upwards around the point of origin. Such a matching process is not only possible, but
in our opinion also often observable.
To avoid misunderstanding, we are far from claiming that the concept of eort function
is awed or unusable. On the contrary, it provides at least two important insights into the
functioning of the labour market. First, the eort function embodies the notion that labour as
a productive input has more dimensions than man-hours. Second, it implies that optimisation
of rms and workers is accordingly multidimensional and that a rm can employ more of low-
intensity man-hours or less of high-intensity man-hours.4
Nevertheless, what we do question is the conclusions about market disequilibrium drawn
from eort functions. The most important consequence of condition (3) is that rms cannot be
expected to set wage primarily in terms of hours. Instead they will optimize production in such
a way that unit wage (in money per eort) will be set equal to the marginal product of eort,
and the nal hourly payment will then be determined by the amount of eort exerted. The
rm will plan the amount of eort units it requires. It will then hire the respective amount of
labour which will supply this amount of eort, that is, either a lot of cheap low-eort workers or
few costly high-eort workers. Let us recall that the price per unit of eort (i.e. `eort wage')
in which workers can compete is a voluntary decision of workers based on their preferences.
At this point we can already conclude: Given that the eort function is fully determined by
workers' preferences, there exists no room for involuntary unemployment.
So far we stressed the voluntary, preference-driven character of the eort function. In the
following section we will turn to another crucial implication of the eciency wage models: the
multidimensionality of labour.
2.1.4 Heterogeneous Labour Markets
The production function in (1) has only one input | labour. Usually, the simplication to
model only one labour market with labour L and one capital market with capital K is justied.
This is because we often assume from the very beginning that there is only one type of labour
and one type of capital. Then, the maximization of prot in the standard textbook form
 = F(K;L)   rKK   wL does not pose any problems for analysis.
We suggest, however, that the situation with eciency-wage models is fundamentally dier-
ent. In these models, one deals by denition with dierent types of labour. Specically, in the
above model Solow introduces the possibility of dierent eort levels e, which implies labour
of varying quality. Yet, Solow still models the labour market as a single one with homogenous
3The case of malnutrition is excluded from our consideration as it does not concern developed economies.
4As a result, it shows that the solution to the prot maximization problem may have more than one solution.
4labour L: See the right-hand term wL in (2). This is in our opinion a serious contradiction
that prevents standard economic analysis | and standard results accordingly. In what follows
we show that this assumption of a homogenenous labour market, which has gone unnoticed in
eciency literature so far, is the necessary element that allows Solow to derive the existence of
involuntary unemployment.
In contrast to the production function (1), let us now dene that each level of eort e
constitutes a dierent type of labour. That is, we now distinguish between labours of dierent
qualities according to the eort that the worker puts into it. The more eort is put into work,
the higher quality of labour follows. For ease of notation, let us also assume that the number
of types (qualities) of labour is nite, i.e. ranging from some inferior labour L1 to top-quality
labour LN. Solow's production function Y = F(eL) now becomes
Y = F(L1;:::;LN): (4)
At rst sight, eort e is absent in the production function in (4). This is because its meaning
is now subsumed under dierent types of labour L1,..., LN. Li corresponds to eort level ei,
which in turn corresponds to wage wi.5 Therefore, we have preserved the link between wages
and eort | the main idea of eciency wage models | but we model dierent eorts in the




fF(L1;:::;LN)   w1L1   :::   wNLNg: (5)
The optimisation problem in this form claries why the treatment of labour matters cru-
cially. Now, the rm still chooses eort (eciency) by choosing wage, but formally does it by
choosing a specic labour market Li. The pairs (w1, L1), ..., (wN, LN) represent the particular
labour markets, assorted by the quality of labour that is traded on them. Importantly, wi is
the Walrasian equilibrium wage prevailing on market for labour of type Li. As a result, in the
optimisation problem (5) the rm does not explicitly choose w as in (2), but does it implicitly
by choosing labour of quality Li with its corresponding price wi.
2.1.5 Equilibrium on the Heterogeneous Market
The implications of this reformulation are far-reaching. Firms still maximize prots by choosing
the optimal eort level, but since we now view labour markets as heterogenous, rms do so by
choosing the optimal labour market where to hire labour. Finding and setting the optimal wage
therefore amounts to choosing a labour market and paying its Walrasian equilibrium wage. This
means, however, that no disequilibrium wage can occur. Any wage chosen is an equilibrium
wage on some market | and this market is chosen. The eort function e(w) can then be
understood as a set of N wage-quality pairs traded on N markets.
By dening labour as heregeneous, we have reached a dierent perspective on the problem
at hand: rms choose between types (qualities) of labour L1,..., LN just as they may choose
5It is crucial to note that index i does not correspond to workers: more workers can be of the same type Li
and one worker can alter his type from Li to Lj, as we show in section 2.1.3. We return to this point in the next
section.
5between types (qualities) of capital K1,..., KN. Our reformulation, in contrast to Solow's
treatment, is therefore a general one. We have shown that dierent eciencies (eorts) can
be simply modelled as dierent types of labour, each of which has its own market. This is
a parallel to dierent types of capital having their own market. Solow, by contrast, assumes
that labour of dierent eciencies is traded on a single market at some uniform price. This
is why he inevitably derives a non-standard situation in which the wage is independent of
demand and supply, and hence where involuntary unemployment exists. By contrast, dening
labour properly as heterogenous shows that there is no room for disequilibrium situations and
involuntary unemployment.6 This refutes the idea of the Solow model that labour is a peculiar,
special input that causes standard market equilibrium to fail.
The confusing feature of labour is that one and the same physical person may exert dierent
eciencies and therefore be present on multiple labour markets. In economics, however, markets
are abstract concepts, not physical places. Thus it does not pose any problem to model dierent
eorts of the same person as dierent markets. We therefore see no reason for abandoning
standard neoclassical economic analysis, contrary to what is done in the Solow (1979) model.
To clarify that what matters more is services oered by inputs rather than their physical
denition, in section 3 we introduce an alternative microeconomic approach, using Lancaster's
characteristic-space model.
2.2 Shapiro-Stiglitz Model
2.2.1 The No-Shirking Condition
In a second very known version of eciency-wage models, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) elaborated
on early literature to include imperfect information. Their basic idea was that when rms cannot
perfectly monitor workers' eort, they may choose to pay higher wages to discourage workers
from shirking. The point of Shapiro-Stiglitz model is not that higher wages simply induce higher
eort, which suced as reason in the basic Solow (1979) model. Here, non-Walrasian wages
play the role of creating involuntary unemployment, which in turn works as a `worker discipline
device': if there was no involuntary unemployment, argue Shapiro and Stiglitz, then shirking
would entail no costs, because after being caught and red, workers would immediately nd
new jobs. Only involuntary unemployment can `discipline' workers by incurring costs of losing
jobs. Therefore, Shapiro and Stiglitz understand non-Walrasian wages as an economy-wide
equilibrium solution to the possibility of shirking.
The model assumes that there are only two eort levels: working and shirking. As a result,
one can inspect three value functions V N
E , V S
E and VU that stand for the present value of (a)
being employed and working, (b) being employed and shirking, and (c) being unemployed,
respectively. Dening these and then imposing the condition under which workers do not shirk
(V N
E  V S
E ) yields the well known no-shirking condition








 ^ w; (6)
6Equilibrium must be attained insofar as neoclassical assumptions on the individual submarkets i are met.
This is not to say that other frictions on these markets do not exist. We merely show that eort or quality
variations of labour per se do not generate disequilibrium.
6where e is eort (disutility from working),  w the unemployment benet (i.e. alternative wage in
case of getting red), q the probability of being caught shirking, b the probability of termination
of working post (exogenous, with no relation to eort), u the unemployment rate, and r the
rate of interest used for discounting future to present value.
Wage ^ w makes workers just indierent between working and shirking. Any wage higher than
^ w ensures that given the current unemployment rate and the parameters of the model, costs
of shirking outweigh its benets. The appealing feature of the model is that the minimum no-
shirking wage ^ w depends on the unemployment rate in the economy | that is, on other rms'
wage decisions | and therefore can be plotted as a function in the labour market diagram.
Higher employment L (equivalent to lower unemployment rate u) lowers workers' costs of getting
red for shirking. Therefore, according to (6), to discourage them from shirking, rms have
to pay them higher wages. This results in the upward-sloping no-shirking condition (NSC)
in Figure 2.7 The optimal wage that the rm sets is w*, given by the intersection of the
labour-demand curve and the no-shirking condition. This time, unlike the Solow model, labour
demand matters for the optimal wage. However, labour supply is still irrelevant in setting of
w*, giving again rise to involuntary unemployment.8
















2.2.2 A Play with Words to Prove Involuntary Unemployment
This conclusion about involuntary unemployment was criticized by Carmichael (1985). He
suggested that those workers who want to work at w* but are not hired can simply `buy' the
job. That is, they oer to pay an `entrance fee' or a `bond' to the rm for giving them the
7Figure 2 is not exactly the one shown in Shapiro, Stiglitz (1984). The authors use a gure with a vertical
labour supply curve at the maximum employment N. We prefer to use a more general version with an upward-
sloping labour supply curve which nevertheless fully maintains the idea of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
8More accurately, in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model it results necessarily, because it is precisely the involuntary
nature of unemployment that disciplines workers and keeps them from shirking. In the Solow model, by contrast,
involuntary unemployment is a possibility, but not a necessity.
7job. This reduces their value from the job to the point where they are indierent between
working and being unemployed. Therefore, unemployment is no longer involuntary. Although
Carmichael's point made an impact9, there is a more serious problem in the model.
Shapiro and Stiglitz give the following reasoning:
\From the worker's point of view, unemployment is involuntary: those without
jobs would be happy to work at w* or lower, but cannot make a credible promise
not to shirk at such wages." Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), p. 438, emphasis original.
In our view, Shapiro and Stiglitz are involved in an outright contradiction. On one hand,
they claim that the workers would be `happy to work at w* or lower'. On the other, they assert
that at such wages `they cannot make a credible promise not to shirk'. One would like to ask the
authors the question: `At w*, would the employees work or shirk?' It appears as if Shapiro and
Stiglitz used a terminological trick on the reader to make their case. The situation in the model
is as follows: One can be either employed or unemployed; further, if one is employed, he can
work or shirk. If one shirks, he does not work at all and thus does not exert any eort. However
trivial this may sound, it matters crucially for the conclusions. Shapiro and Stiglitz have us
believe that at w*, L0   L* people in fact oer to do something for the potential employer,
but somehow cannot get the job. However, as the authors themselves write, they do not oer
to work | they instead oer to shirk. Therefore, there cannot be involuntary unemployment.
When Shapiro and Stiglitz call unemployment involuntary, they in fact pity workers for not
getting paid for not working.10
The confusion of words is caused by the use of the category `employed, but shirking'. For
economic analysis, it does not matter whether one is idly sitting at home and is called `unem-
ployed', or whether he is idly sitting at work (shirking) and is called `employed, but shirking'.11
The economic meaning of the two categories | the employed but shirking and the unemployed
| is identical in the model: the person does not produce anything. Yet, in Shapiro's and
Stiglitz's logic, when one oers to shirk at w* and rms, knowing this, do not oer him the job,
he is called `involuntarily unemployed'. If Shapiro and Stiglitz had not used the term `employed'
for those who do not work at their job, they could never have reached this conclusion.
2.2.3 Labour Supply versus the No-Shirking Condition
Shapiro and Stiglitz chose to introduce the simplest case where the only two options are e > 0
for working and e = 0 for shirking. Let us broaden the model to a more general case with
9See Shapiro's and Stiglitz's (1985) reaction in which they retreated somewhat from their claim about invol-
untary unemployment.
10Similar self-contradictory statements like that of Shapiro and Stiglitz above can be found in Yellen (1984, p.
202) and Romer (2006, p. 455).
11There is no dierence between `unemployed' and `employed, but shirking' in the model since Shapiro and
Stiglitz allow only two eort levels in their model: e > 0 for working and 0 for shirking. Thus, shirking at work
amounts to zero output just as being unemployed does.
As a side note, we add that `employed' in economics has always meant `utilised'. Therefore, `employed, but
shirking' is a confused connection that the authors fail to explain. See terms such as `employed shirker' in
Shapiro, Stiglitz (1984, p. 436.)
80 < e1 < e2, where e1 is the shirking state12 and e2 the working state. It is easy to show,
however, that this does not change anything about the failure of the model to prove involuntary
unemployment. It suces to inspect carefully the denitions of the NSC and the labour supply
curve.
In order to construct the no-shirking condition, Shapiro and Stiglitz rst had to empty the
meaning of the labour supply curve. The labour supply curve, in all economic works since the
curve was conceived, has always meant precisely the no-shirking condition. The condition of
working at a given eort level | as the opposite of shirking (i.e. failing to reach this eort level)
| is exactly the idea of the labour supply curve: one is oering to supply labour of given quality
in exchange for reward on the labour supply curve, and not to supply this quality beyond the
supply curve. Therefore, Shapiro and Stiglitz necessarily have to redene the labour supply
curve away from its original meaning in order to move its content into their newly conceived
`no-shirking condition'. Hence, in their model, the labour supply curve also comprises those
who in fact do not want to supply the labour of given quality. Only then can the authors come
up with the NSC curve to denote those who will `really' work. We stress that the invalidity of
the model does not rest on whether eort levels are dened as e1 = 0 and e2 > 0 or 0 < e1 < e2.
The reason is that the borderline between working and shirking is given by the denition of
what L means on the respective market.
At a closer look, the root of the problem just described is the same as that of the Solow model
identied in Section 2.1.4: labour L on the horizontal axis in Figure 2 is not always measured
in the same units. Labour used in the non-shirking condition is something completely dierent
from `labour' (i.e., not labour but shirking in any form) ascribed by Shapiro and Stiglitz to the
labour supply curve. Then the horizontal axis has two alternating meanings, and hence the
gure cannot be used for standard microeconomic analysis. We explain deeper problems of this
practice in Section 3.
For now, we conclude that there is no involuntary unemployment in the Shapiro-Stiglitz
model. Workers voluntarily choose their eort level at any wage. If rms know that with a
certain wage and certain level of employment additional workers would shirk at work, and for
this reason do not oer them work, then nothing of involuntary nature occurs. The NSC curve
in reality coincides with the correct labour supply curve.13
2.2.4 Firm Optimisation
The central claim of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model is that rm optimisation leads to involuntary
unemployment, and that this in turn represents market ineciency which needs to be corrected.
Still the model leaves the interaction of rms on the market largely undened. Let us therefore
analyze the production side in more detail.
The model assumes that there are M identical rms which have aggregate production func-
12Shirking from the point of view of the rm is any positive eort lower then what was agreed in the employment
contract, i.e. any positive eort lower than the marginal product equivalent to the agreed wage.
13To avoid misunderstanding, we do not claim that due to imperfect monitoring the wages oered by rms
cannot be higher than what would be the case under perfect monitoring. We only claim that those unemployed
are unemployed voluntarily and that the distinction between the NSC curve and the labour supply curve is
erroneous.
9tion (see Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), footnote 9):







where by symmetry Li = L
M. Most strikingly the model is missing an analysis of competition in
the sense of how M is determined and who stands behind these rms. This raises the question
why the economy does not end in one of the extreme states: either there might be just one
producer or each labourer might be self-employed. Recall that all producers are identical and














This means that the latter case where rms are dissolved completely should be preferable.
In order to resolve this issue, we must consider yet another confusing point made by Shapiro
& Stiglitz. They dispute the eciency of market equilibrium by stating that
\The natural unemployment rate is too high." Shapiro & Stiglitz, ibid, p. 440.
They nd that workers are paid their marginal product MPL, and claim that higher employ-
ment could be nanced from the producer surplus of average product APL over MPL (see the
feasibility constraint in equation 12, Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984). Most importantly Shapiro &
Stiglitz do not oer any reason why producer surplus should be redistributed: they simply
claim that it belongs to workers.14
There is a stark contradiction in their argument: On the one hand, Shapiro & Stiglitz
claim that the whole product belongs to workers. On the other hand, they insist on workers
being employed not on their own but in rms. The solution can be seen easily: If Shapiro &
Stiglitz want workers to earn a wage equal to APL, workers should become self-employed and
cash in this benet. Otherwise, if existence of M rms is assumed | as is indeed the case in
real economies |, there exists a certain value added in rms which naturally belongs to the
organizer of the rm.15
3 Generalization: Alternative Microeconomic Approach
3.1 Deeper Problems of Homogeneous Markets
We have shown that modeling labour as heterogeneous when eciency is studied results in
fundamentally dierent conclusions as compared to the single-market approach practised in
Solow and Shapiro-Stiglitz models. In this part, we suggest reasons why the heterogeneous
14This is in eect a direct attack on the marginal revolution in economics, which surprisingly did not receive
much attention in subsequent literature. We note that Shapiro's and Stiglitz's proposed solution of redistribution
of the surplus APL over MPL is based on nothing else than Karl Marx's surplus value theory.
15This value added lies especially in investing the time necessary for the production process, gathering required
xed investments (capital) and managing highly advanced processes of production. These complicated procedures
are called roundabout methods of production and their distinctive feature lies in investing funds now to consume
their products later, instead of enjoying the funds for immediate consumption.
10labour approach should be strongly preferred. As the reference model, we take the basic Solow
(1979) model from section 2.1, but all of our arguments below apply just as well to the Shapiro-
Stiglitz model.
The goal of the demand-supply analysis in economics is to study the relationship between
prices and quantities. A precondition for this to be possible is to dene precisely the good or
service whose quantity and price is to be studied. Solow's model, however, violates this require-
ment. The idea of the model is that higher wages increase workers' eort, for which reason
rms may choose to pay above-equilibrium wages and thus create involuntary unemployment.
Yet, this very idea implies that by oering higher wages, rms demand dierent type of labour
than with lower wages. This means, however, that labour L on the horizontal axis changes its
own denition while wage moves. This is a situation that standard microeconomic theory does
not allow. The consequences are serious | comparative statics cannot be conducted.
For instance, to compare the amount of employment with the Walrasian equilibrium wage
weq and with Solow model's optimal wage w*, we would want to know the dierence Leq  L*.
Yet, we cannot subtract these two numbers since each of them stands for labour of dierent
quality.16 This point cannot be overemphasized. In fact, the varying denition of L on the
horizontal axis even prevents the use of demand and supply curves. The entire demand-supply
analysis is built on the assumption of ceteris paribus. If labour is being continually redened
when wage is changing, then the ceteris paribus condition is violated: what changes is not only
quantity of labour, but also its quality | i.e. the very denition of labour itself. We borrow a
statement from Rothbard:
\The denition of a good is that it consists of an interchangeable supply of one or
more units. Therefore, every unit will always be valued equally with every other."
Rothbard (2004 [1962]), p. 320, emphasis original.
The endogeneity of labour quality on wage causes Solow's model to violate this condition.
As a result, it cannot use the standard demand-supply analysis and thus cannot claim to
demonstrate involuntary unemployment. In fact, Solow's theory does not model any meaningful
market.17
16Take a parallel with the rm buying capital equipment | say, trucks. It can buy an expensive, top-quality
truck from Mercedes-Benz, or it can buy a cheap, low-quality truck from Daihatsu. However, to subtract the
number of Mercedes's from the number of Daihatsus bought does not make any sense. The two trucks have
dierent characteristics despite both of them being trucks. By the same token, it makes little sense to subtract
the number of high-quality, expensive bricklayers from the number of low-quality, cheap bricklayers. Certainly,
the dierence is that one and the same bricklayer can exert dierent eorts and thus be a high-quality bricklayer
at one time and a low-quality one at another. This surely does not hold for trucks. However, this is still not
a reason for modeling this situation as one labour market. Markets are abstract concepts dened according to
characteristics of goods, not according to the physical fact that two types of goods can be produced by one and
the same person. The fact that one single person can do dierent jobs or exert dierent eorts is economically
irrelevant. What matters is the characteristic of the resulting goods or services.
17Later on, in a presidential address delivered for the American Economic Association, Solow himself called
for a heterogeneous approach to labour markets:
\(...) That fact of life merely reminds us that `labour' is not a well-dened homogenenous factor
of production." Solow (1980), p. 4.
Yet, Solow never changed his 1979 eciency-wage model to incorporate this view. We have shown that this
statement of Sollow eectively invalidates the conclusions of his own eciency-wage theory.
11In conclusion, if labour is heterogeneous due to model assumptions (eort considerations),
then to model it in one homogeneous labour market is not only self-contradictory, but it makes
impossible the entire demand-supply analysis that one needs to derive results about market
equilibrium. We suggest that the homogeneous labour approach should be replaced by multiple
heterogeneous labour markets, diering by the quality of labour oered on them.18 This is the
direction of current research, among existing papers we refer to research by Bagger, Christensen
& Mortensen (2010). In the next section, we oer a formal setting for the heterogeneous market
approach.
3.2 The Characteristics Model
3.2.1 Lancaster's Model
Although mainstream economic textbooks tend to ignore the problem of goods' heterogeneity,
this issue was understood by many economists and it was even modelled by some.
Perhaps the most complex theoretical model was developed by Lancaster (1966, 1971).
In standard consumer theory preferences are dened on the space of goods, i.e. consumer
utility function takes a vector of goods as its argument. In contrast, Lancaster postulates
that consumers in fact choose between goods according to their characteristics, i.e. consumer
utility function takes a vector of characteristics as its argument. The link between goods and
characteristics is established by means of two axiomatic principles stemming from everyday
experience:
1. A single good may possess several dierent valuable characteristics.
2. A number of dierent goods may have some of their characteristics exactly the same.
In formal terms Lancaster (1971) denes the transformation from the goods space (G-space)
18It is interesting to note that the term eciency-wages was not born in the rich literature of the 1970s and
1980s that claimed the existence of involuntary unemplyoment. Already Alfred Marshall (1964 [1920], p. 456)
used the term `eciency-wages' to explain that wages in the same profession tend to converge to one value (i.e.
conrm the law of one price) after eciency of the worker is taken into account. He stated:
\Competition tends to make weekly wages in similar employments not equal, but proportionate
to the eciency of the workers." Marshall (1964 [1920]), p. 454.
Thus Marshall realized that workers within the same profession dier in eciency of their work. And he went
further:
\... it is not an uncommon saying (...) that he is the best business man who contrives to pay the
highest wages." Marshall (1964 [1920]), p. 457.
This is a strong indication that Marshall, some 60 years before eciency wage literature appeared, understood
that higher wages bring higher eort and thus higher eciency of labour. But apparently, he saw dierent
eciencies as dierent markets. This is why, unlike Solow, Shapiro or Stiglitz, he made no mention of involuntary
unemployment.
12to characteristics space (C-space):
z z z = Bx x x; (7)





where bij is the quantity of the i-th characteristic possessed by a unit amount of the j-th good,
zi is the quantity of the i-th characteristic, xj is the quantity of j-th good, r is the number
of characteristics and n is the number of goods. B is the consumption technology matrix with
elements bij and it describes all goods on the market in terms of their characteristics. Note
that equation (7) is based on two further assumptions:
1. Linearity. zp = bpjxj.
2. Additivity. zq = bqjxj + bqkxk.
The consumer optimisation problem then takes the form:
max
x x x u(z z z) (8)
s.t. z z z = Bx x x
x x x  0 0 0
p p p0x x x  Q
where the last line is the budget constraint. The choice variable is still the vector of goods x x x
but it enters the objective function only through the consumption technology transformation.
The vector of characteristics z z z is what matters to the consumer.
We need to highlight the separation mechanism between B and u(). The consumption
technology matrix B is assumed to be objectively observable at least in theory.19 B represents
information that all consumers can agree on: area of a at, engine power of a car, or weight of a
laptop. Subjective perceptions about goods, that is how individual characteristics are relatively
valuable to a given consumer, are still contained in the utility function u().
Since in a general case r = n cannot be guaranteed, properties of a solution to (8) are not
straightforward. In particular, it appears reasonable to assume that r < n, since producers will
try to develop goods combining various characteristics to satisfy as many consumers as possible.
In this case Lancaster (ibid) shows that consumer with utility function u() will not con-
sume all n goods but at most r goods and often even less than r goods. In other words, some
of the goods will not be purchased at all by this consumer. They will be those goods which
do not have an attractive combination of price-discounted characteristics so as to satisfy the
given preferences. Lancaster explains that corner solutions to the optimisation problem become
general, as compared to textbook consumer theory. Another important property of the charac-
teristics framework is that small changes in prices of goods that are not consumed do not aect
equilibrium choice of x x x*.
19This is equivalent to producer theory where production technology is assumed to be hypothetically observable
by all producers.
13Below we show that both properties have important implications when we approach the
labour market in a similar way.20
3.2.2 Market for Labour Characteristics
It is both a straightforward and, as far as we know, hitherto unexplored idea to extend Lan-
caster's approach to the labour market, which we propose in line with our analysis in the
previous sections.
In our opinion, the characteristics model easily accommodates the main features of labour
markets which can be observed in practice: Above all the advanced level of workers' specializa-
tion and the elaborate screening during job matching process for the majority of vacancies.
Assume that xj's represent n labourer characteristic-types who oer their work on the
market, and each of the workers has r characteristics zi. Again it seems natural to assume that
r < n, since rms generally look for a limited bundle of knowledge and skills. Thus employers
solve the optimisation problem in (8).
The two important properties of any solution to (8) described in section 3.2.1 apply. Given
workers' characteristics captured in B, rms will not consider all candidates for their vacancies
but rather search for those with the most favourable combination of desired characteristics
discounted by their prices.
We illustrate this in Figure 3 with n = 3 and r = 2, where the budget constraint in G-space is
transformed by B 2 M(23) to C-space. On the left hand side (LHS), the tetrahedron represents
combinations (consumption bundles) of three characteristic-types of labourers (x1;x2;x3)0 which
the rm can aord given budget Q. Since the rm is interested in characteristics, it projects
the tetrahedron into C-space. In terms of geometry, the four vertices on the LHS correspond
to the four vertices on the RHS in Figure 3. The tetrahedron is convex, hence the four vertices
determine the envelope of the convex quadrilateral on the RHS, which is the budget constraint
in C-space.
The optimum of an employer with u(z z z) as depicted conditional on budget constraint Q lies on
one of the edges of the quadrilateral, so that a combination of two out of the three characteristic-
types of candidates will be chosen for the job. Going back to G-space, the optimum will
lie on one of the edges, say between x1 and x2, while labourers of characteristic-type 3 will
not be considered (x3 = 0). As is apparent from the C-quadrilateral, the characteristic-type
corresponding to the leftmost nonzero vertex is not competitive because his price-discounted
combination of characteristics is too expensive.
The crucial conclusion of the model concerns the importance of relative prices of labour
20It is useful to mention that when it comes to recognizing the importance of product heterogeneity, empirical
economics seems to be one step ahead of theory. The characteristics model has been applied in frequently cited
empirical studies on demand systems for dierentiated products. Perhaps the most inuential is the paper by
Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (BLP 1995) who estimated demand parameters in the U.S. automobile market.
In order to make the concept of characteristics operational and econometrically sound, BLP worked with
observed and unobserved characteristics of cars and estimated the respective demand slopes for the observed (or
better: measured) ones. BLP enhanced their model by second choice data (BLP 2004). Other papers include
Bresnahan, Stern & Trajtenberg (BST 1997), who estimate the demand system for personal computers. These
studies demonstrate that heterogeneity of products is a relevant and recognized fact in empirical economics, but
much less so in theoretical economics.











characteristics: If a low-eort or low-skilled worker is unemployed, either he must lower his
wage signicantly (this shifts the vertex of the G-tetrahedron away from the origin), or he
must change the characteristic oered to high eort or high skill as expressed by coecients
of matrix B. Geometrically both changes will turn edges of the C-quadrilateral in Figure 3.
Another option for the worker is to look for an employer with a dierent utility function.
The possibility of involuntary unemployment is excluded, since unemployment stems simply
from wage-characteristic mismatch. As long as workers are willing to adjust, the unemployment
gap can easily be bridged.
4 Conclusions
The theory of \eciency wages" is a popular argument used to show that rational market
interaction generates downward wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment. We identify two
crucial fallacies of this idea. For one, eciency wage models ignore the most important feature of
labour markets: labour heterogeneity. Thus high-eort and low-eort units of labour are viewed
as completely interchangeable, which however from the viewpoint of the rm they surely cannot
be. For two, eciency wage papers are plagued with a signicant inner inconsistency: The
resulting unemployment is classied as involuntary although it results from the eort decision
of the worker where there is nothing rigid other than the worker's very own preferences.
To remove these contradictions we reformulate the theory in a more accurate way. Each of
the eort or quality levels has to be viewed as a separate market which has its own clearing
quantity and price. As such unemployment is a result of workers' reluctance to adjust to the
prevailing market conditions on the respective narrow labour sub-market.
Alternatively, the labour market can be modelled by means of characteristics possessed by
workers, as was originally proposed for the goods market by Lancaster (1966). This approach
is based on a more complex analysis yet leads to the same conclusions. When some worker is
unemployed he nds himself in a corner solution of the market optimisation. As a result he has
15to either signicantly alter his wage or signicantly alter the bundle of provided characteristics.
This way he can turn the corner solution to his side and become employed.
Both these modications reinforce our central claim that free market interaction cannot
lead to unemployment other than voluntary.
A Application: Did Henry Ford Pay Eciency Wages?
In a well-known empirical paper, Ra and Summers (1987) ask whether eciency wage theories
can be applied to notable historical episodes of wage increases. As an exemplary case, they take
Henry Ford's automobile factory in Detroit in years before World War I. They conclude that
Ford's move to increase wages signicantly and the subsequent job queues conrm the existence
of involuntary umemployment.
Ford Motor Company saw skyrocketing growth of sales and high protability since its foun-
dation in 1903. However, mass production based on standardised, repetitive work in unpleasant
factory conditions gradually caused dissatisfaction on workers' part. As Ra and Summers doc-
ument,
\... worker dissatisfaction took visible form. In 1913, annual turnover at the Ford
plant reached 370%. Ford had to hire 50,448 men during the course of the year in
order to maintain the average labor force at 13,623. (...) At the same time that
turnover became so alarming, Ford also faced and epidemic of absenteeism. In 1913,
the company suered a 10% daily absenteeism rate." Ra and Summers (1987), pp.
63{64.
Ford even complained about workers' `soldiering', i.e. deliberate (but hidden) boycott of
production without declaration of an ocial strike. The problems became so grave that Ford
rst responded by increasing wages across-the-board by 15% in October 1913. This move helped
only temporarily and problems of similar nature returned very shortly. Hence, in January 1914,
Ford ordered a wage increase of more than 100%, raising the daily wage from USD 2.34 to USD
5.00. The measure was accompanied by a reduction of working hours from 9 to 8 hours a day.
Using this example, Ra and Summers aim to conrm the two major assertions of eciency
wage theories: (a) that the productivity improvement at Ford's plant more than oset higher
wages, thereby leading to increased prots, and (b) that the higher wages caused disequilibrium
on the labour market, creating involuntary unemployment.
As regards the rst claim, Ra and Summers oer plenty of evidence that the wage increase
paid o to Ford. Between 1913 and 1914, the turnover rate fell from 370% to 54%; the company
had to lay o 6 times fewer workers in 1914 than in 1913; better work discipline allowed the
company to signicantly lower material costs; thanks to higher productivity, it could reduce
average workforce by 11%. Even with fewer workers and shorter working hours, the plant
increased the number of produced cars by 15% year-on-year. The overall eect was that Ford's
net prot grew, in real terms, by 15% between 1913 and 1914.
We do not nd this result surprising. Ford found that he may well achieve higher prots
with more expensive, but higher-quality labour rather than with cheap, but low-quality labour.
16As we noted in Section 2.1.5, this is a standard, prot-maximizing choice of inputs, be it labour
or capital.
However, Ra and Summers then attempt to prove the second claim, i.e. that the new,
higher wage was a disequilibrium one. In their view, this is demonstrated by the job queues
that appeared in front of Ford's factory. They quote colourful newspaper reports from the days
following the pay rise:
\Twelve thousand men, more than congregated around the plant on any other
day last week celebrated the [ve-dollar day] with a rush on the plant which resulted
in a riot and turning of a re hose on the crowd in weather but little dierent from
zero." Ra and Summers (1987), p. 73. Brackets original.
They further document that the wage increase was not meant to attract more highly skilled
workers, given the fact that production techniques at Ford's factory did not require more qual-
ied labour than before. Altogether, these considerations lead Ra and Summers to conclude
that \Ford's wage surely exceeded his workers' opportunity cost and put him in the position of
rationing jobs." (p. 83).
In our opinion, Ra and Summers fall in the trap of dening types of labour too narrowly.
In Section 2.1.4 we made the case that labour must be understood fully heterogeneously, taking
account of all possible dierences. In contrast, Ra and Summers only see dierences in types
of labour when it comes to qualication and skills. They assert that Ford was not looking for
dierent type of labour when he raised wages because he still demanded the same qualications
and skills. Hence, they see an above-equilibrium wage on the job market after the pay rise. On
the contrary, we suggest that Ford in fact was looking for a dierent type of labour because
he wanted more reliable, more disciplined and more vigorous labour. These characteristics are
no less a `type' of labour than formal skill or qualication. Therefore, Ford went to another
market to hire labour, and paid the correspondingly higher wage to obtain it.21
The fact that Ford decided to raise wages dramatically after serious problems with ab-
senteeism, boycotts, low morale and poor discipline only corroborates our case. Ford could
no longer aord to pay a low-quality input, and decided instead to pay a better one. As we
stressed in Section 3.1, when one increases his eort, discipline and reliability in response to
higher wage, we are moving from one market to another because the denition of labour L is
changing. Therefore, involuntary unemployment does not follow.
The large job queues outside Ford's plant do not make the case for involuntary unemply-
oment either. The fact that a number of applicants show up for a job recruitment is not a proof
that all of the applicants have the characteristics that the rm is looking for. Our application
of Lancaster's model (Section 3.2.2) shows that unemployment stems from wage-characteristic
mismatch. It is not surprising that after the announcement of a 100% pay rise, thousands of
candidates came to apply for jobs. Yet, Ford was looking for a certain combination of charac-
teristics that the recruitment event was to reveal, and surely only some applicants had them.
In other words, it is only during the recruitment process | not before it | that the applicant
21As we pointed out in footnote 5, it is crucial to understand that dierent types of labour may well be
represented by the very same labourer. Thus Ford did not necessarily have to hire dierent labourers, but just
had to induce them to exert higher eort.
17nds out what exact labour market the rm is targeting and whether he ts in it. Therefore,
the mere fact that there are more applicants than the rm is willing to take on can never prove
the existence of involuntary unemployment.22
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